Preparing for Humanitarian Demining
in Post-conflict Colombia
tory, the Colombian government still faces significant challenges in addressing the country’s mine
problem, which has claimed more than 11,000 victims since 1991.1 Although the overall number of
new landmine victims significantly decreased over the past eight years, survey and clearance work
has been limited to more secure zones of the countryside because of the threat from nonstate
armed groups to deminers and people living in conflict areas. Meanwhile, the risk to civilians living
in parts of the country where demining activities have not taken place has not changed significantly,
and Colombia remains among the countries with the highest number of mine casualties each year.
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Figure 1. Landmine accidents by department, 2010–2014.

parts of the country only. Insufficient information on the ex-

conflict de-escalation, prioritizing sites where the population

tent of mine contamination is problematic for the planning

is at greatest risk.2

and mobilization of resources for humanitarian demining,
and remains the single most significant issue the government
faces in tackling Colombia’s mine problem.

8

Preparedness for a Broader Effort

Elevation of the mine issue in the peace talks not only

Beginning in early 2015, however, the dynamics of mine

served to launch the pilot effort to begin survey and clearance

action in Colombia changed significantly. Since the initiation

of areas where mine risk is greatest, it also gave renewed ur-

of direct talks between the government and FARC in 2012, the

gency to preparedness for quickly identifying and clearing a

peace process has yielded substantive agreements on the road

much broader part of the country. The reorganization of the

to achieving a negotiated end to the 50-year conflict. Although

presidential cabinet following the re-election of President

several issues remain to be resolved before a comprehensive

Juan Manuel Santos included the designation of a Minister

settlement is complete, agreements on land restitution and ru-

for Post-Conflict who is tasked with land restitution, victims’

ral development, political participation, and a way forward

rights and landmine issues under a coherent implementation

confronting the illicit drug trade have raised optimism that

strategy. Bringing these interrelated elements together poses a

the remaining agenda items can be rectified. Ending the fight-

significant challenge for the Colombian government. In many

ing and beginning the disarmament, demobilization and rein-

cases, land restitution and resettlement of displaced popula-

tegration of insurgent combatants remains a key point.

tions were impeded by many factors, including the ongoing

Discussions in early 2015 focused on measures designed

conflict and the limitations in the government’s efforts to de-

to decrease the intensity of the conflict as a prelude to a pos-

fine the extent of the landmine problem in the countryside, as

sible ceasefire and eventual agreement on demobilization. In

well as by its still relatively modest capacity to clear hazardous

March 2015, government and FARC negotiators agreed upon

areas once they are identified.

a confidence-building process to establish safe conditions for

With at least 400 government deminers from the

residents of high-risk areas contaminated by landmines and

Colombian military and another 160 from The HALO Trust

other explosive remnants of war. The parties agreed to im-

deployed for clearance and survey work in four of the country’s

plement a pilot clearance project within the framework of

32 administrative departments, Colombia faces a huge task in
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Colombian deminer training for clearance operations.

moving quickly to address mine contamination. Landmines

clearance or survey activities. Moreover, government data also

affect as many as 11 departments severely, and have at least

shows that 75 percent of the accidents in the past five years oc-

moderately impacted another three. Underlying the degree to

curred in departments where no humanitarian demining op-

which the task will grow as the peace process progresses is the

erations were ongoing.3

fact that of these 14 departments that account for more than

In February 2015, the government announced a new

97 percent of all landmine accidents in Colombia in the past

plan to expand its institutional clearance capacity by pro-

five years, only one, Antioquia, is currently the site of mine

jecting the conversion of up to 10,000 military personnel to
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Figure 2. Landmine accidents versus clearance status in selected municipalities.5

humanitarian demining tasks by 2017. Also announced was

Given the urgency of survey and clearance work in parts of

mining organizations to no more than six months duration

the country where the mine problem is most severe but poor-

before the end of 2015. The key question about the viability

ly defined, an approach is needed that clarifies the extent and

of these projections lay in the lack of funding to train, equip

scope of contamination in order to prioritize efforts for the

and deploy large numbers of deminers without major external

next two to three years while military and civilian demining

funding and technical support. The government’s own projec-

capacities expand. To date, security has been the overarch-

tions cited the need for US$151 million from international do-

ing consideration in assigning municipalities for demining

nors for the first year following the signing of a peace accord

operations. However, in a post-conflict context, areas with

in order to carry out these plans, representing a more than 30-

the greatest risk to the local population should be considered

fold increase in the annual amount of external financing that

highest priority. Thus far, little evaluation has been conducted

has been available over the past five years. Funding require-

using risk as the principal criterion for survey and clearance

ments needed to execute the expansion and clearance efforts

prioritization.

through 2021 were set at more than an additional $308 mil-

The government has a huge volume of statistical infor-

lion. While some increase in international support could be

mation related to landmines, but to this point, has had lit-

expected following the signing of a peace agreement with the

tle success in trying to catalogue and analyze some 30,000

remaining nonstate armed groups, funding will most likely

indicators or “events” involving landmines that occurred

not reach the levels needed to support Colombia’s projections.

since 1991. Events include accidents, mine clearance during

4

10

Defining the Problem

an effort to speed up the accreditation process for civilian de-

focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | July 2015 | 19.2

military operations, improvised mine and explosive cache
discoveries, and reports on suspected mined areas. Many of
these data points lack specific geographic location data. Efforts to eliminate the least useful data have thus far been met
with only limited success, and the database is not particularly
useful in either defining the extent and scope of mine contamination or in setting priorities for humanitarian demining activities. One of the means used in the past to clear events from
the system has been the use of non-technical survey (NTS)
by teams operating in municipalities approved for demining operations. However, experiences in municipalities where
NTS was used to confirm or cancel suspected hazardous areas
(SHA) indicate that only a small percentage of events in the
national database resulted in confirmation of mine contami-

Typical construction of an improvised landmine in Colombia.

nation. For example, in San Carlos, Antioquia, an extensive
survey effort in 2011 resulted in the cancellation of about 90
percent of the events investigated as SHAs.

Before the start of extensive demining activities in San

Accident statistics found within the database could, by

Carlos, the incidence of mine accidents began to drop precipi-

themselves, provide a more useful tool for prioritizing areas

tously. According to Dirección para la Acción Integral contra

for countrywide demining operations. A review of accident

Minas Antipersonal, which is responsible for the coordination

data points shows the mine problem to be more concen-

of the Colombian government’s mine action program and is

trated in fewer areas of the country than the national totals

the Technical Secretariat for the National Mine Action Au-

would seem to indicate. As the overall number of landmine

thority, the number of accidents fell from a high point of 52

accidents decreased significantly over an eight-year peri-

in 2005 to 15, 14, four and two in subsequent years before ex-

od, a limited number of municipalities exist where the rate

tensive survey and clearance operations began there.5 In every

of mine casualties remains high. Twenty-one municipalities,

other municipality where sustained demining interventions

registering an average of at least four mine accidents per year

have taken place since 2009, mine accident figures followed

between 2010 and 2014, accounted for 54 percent of all ac-

a similar trend.

cidents nationwide, and a total of 50 municipalities reported more than 75 percent of all accidents in the same period.

Improvised Mine Life Span

All of these cases were concentrated in the 13 most severely

Another critical factor in determining where to focus

impacted departments: Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó,

efforts in a post-conf lict context is the impact of mine

Cordoba, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander,

functionality over time. A rigorous, scientific study of the

Putumayo, Tolima and Valle del Cauca.

impact of aging on various types of improvised mines used

In most clearance operations conducted by the Colombian

in Colombia has not yet been conducted, limiting conclu-

military’s humanitarian demining units, the density of mined

sions to those drawn from anecdotal observations. How-

areas was found to be extremely sparse. Analysis of the San

ever, the downward trend in the number of mine accidents

Carlos case shows that 63 improvised mines and six pieces of

in municipalities considered secure, or consolidated, shows

unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found when clearing near-

a more significant correlation between the point when a

ly 160,000 sq m (1,722,224 sq ft) over a period of almost three

municipality is sufficiently secure to begin humanitarian

years. Similar results are characteristic of all mine clearance

demining activities than to when survey and mine clearance

operations in Colombia to date, despite marked improvement

operations are actually initiated.

in amount of SHAs canceled through NTS. In all clearance

The historical case of El Salvador holds some useful in-

operations in civilian communities since 2007, the density

sights about the impact of mine aging and functionality that

of mines and UXO has been one unit for every 1,710 sq m

could be applicable in Colombia. Following the peace agree-

(18,406 sq ft) of land cleared. 3

ment that ended El Salvador’s internal conflict in 1992, a
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limited effort was made to mark and

provides the best evidence for bring-

clear mined areas that were installed by

ing areas of greatest risk into focus to

government forces. Use of improvised

help define clearance priorities. This

landmines by the Salvadoran insurgen-

information can best determine when

cy was widespread, causing roughly half

and where to deploy clearance assets.

of the Salvadoran military’s casualties

NTS teams will be key in reducing the

in the final seven years of the conflict.

amount of surface area requiring clear-

The mines were similar in construction

ance in priority zones.

and function to those currently being

Other municipalities that fall outside

used by nonstate armed groups in Co-

this high-priority category also need to

lombia. When the fighting ended in El

be addressed. Of particular importance

Salvador, the number of mine accidents

is land release to displaced and dispos-

quickly declined. In 1992, there were

sessed populations across a broader

579 victims of accidents with mines and

part of the country. In these munici-

UXO. The following year, the number

palities, NTS teams can play an impor-

fell to 259, and only one of these was at-

tant role in canceling areas that remain

tributed to an improvised landmine.6

in Colombia’s database because of mine

Improvised mines used by nonstate

events that occurred in previous de-

armed groups in Colombia vary in size

cades. SHAs that cannot be canceled

and construction, but they most often

will still require clearance assets before

use 9-volt alkaline batteries to initiate

being released through technical sur-

detonation. Although mines are usu-

vey demining. However, survey teams

ally emplaced using plastic bags and

marking these areas, accompanied by

other material to limit vulnerability to

prevention campaigns, will greatly re-

moisture, battery life is critical to deter-

duce the risk to nearby communities

mining whether a mine will continue

until clearance is carried out.

functioning. Commercially sold, alkaline batteries advertise a shelf life of no

Conclusion

more than five years under ideal stor-

Colombia will face many chal-

age conditions and can probably func-

lenges in the coming years as it deals

tion for a shorter period of time when

with its longstanding mine problem.

employed in improvised mines that are

A peace agreement between the gov-

fully or partially buried, particular-

ernment and nonstate armed groups

ly given the damp, tropical conditions

would likely open most of Colombia

found in most parts of the country.

for humanitarian demining activities,
but the country’s size and geography

Prioritization of Work

Considering the probable limited

areas of greatest need first for survey

life cycle of improvised mines, the con-

and clearance while national capacity

centration of the most serious mine

is expanded. Understanding the extent,

problems in 50 of Colombia’s 1,119 mu-

severity and nature of mine contamina-

nicipalities, and the limited existing

tion is critical to developing future in-

survey and clearance capacity, the gov-

tervention plans, and the information

ernment should avoid undertaking a

to develop this awareness is available

dispersed, unfocused nationwide clear-

now to begin preparations for work to-

ance effort and instead prioritize its

ward a mine-free Colombia.

strategy and planning based on severity of impact. Accident data since 2010
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demand a strategy that will prioritize
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See endnotes page 65
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